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The summer of 2015 may well be remembered as a turning 
point in the history of both migration to Europe and Euro-
pean integration. There was a further rise in mixed inflows 
of migrants and refugees, with a diversification of the routes 
employed – in particular, a surge in transits across the 
Eastern Mediterranean and the Western Balkans. Secondly, 
the already dynamic map of political reactions and policy 
responses entered a phase of hectic and deep change, due 
primarily to a major shift in the position of Germany.
The German U-turn
Only a few months earlier, when the June 2015 European 
Council failed to deal with the escalating asylum crisis amid 
unusually explicit and bitter rifts among its leaders, Berlin was 
still acting as key defender of the status quo embodied in the 
‘Dublin rules’ that countries on the EU periphery (Italy most of 
all) were denouncing as unsustainably unbalanced. Already 
on that occasion, however, a new awareness was emerging, as 
could be seen in a strikingly candid declaration made by Chan-
cellor Merkel, who described the migration issue as the ‘biggest 
challenge’ that Europe had faced during her time in office.1 
Germany’s strategic revirement ripened over the summer. By 
the end of August, it had been made public, and implemen-
tation had started. The first concrete consequence was the 
decision taken on 21 August by the German Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugees (BAMF)2, de facto suspending the 
already extremely difficult application of the Dublin regulation 
for Syrian nationals. This was done by temporarily refusing 
to test whether Syrian war refugees had first entered the EU 
through the territory of another member state and should thus 
be returned there, as in principle required under Dublin rules.
Such a major spontaneous and unilateral assumption of 
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1 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS_BRIE_558757_outcome_
june_european_council.pdf
2 http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/germany-suspends-
dublin-agreement-syrian-refugees-317065
responsibility was immediately accompanied by strong 
demands that all other member states should follow suit, 
each taking its part in sharing what was underscored as 
being a common responsibility.
Leading by example
Berlin quickly managed to get the hitherto hesitant French 
government over to its side. On 3 September Merkel and 
Hollande announced they would table a joint proposal for 
binding reception quotas.3 The German–French duo thus 
engineered a major shift,  thus taking sides with Italy (which 
had been advocating such new approach for years) and the 
European Commission, which in its first proposal for a new 
European Agenda on Migration had included a mandatory 
relocation mechanism founded on a ‘redistribution key 
based on criteria such as GDP, size of population, unemploy-
ment rate and past numbers of asylum seekers and of reset-
tled refugees’.4
The impact on the media and public opinion, not only in 
Europe, has been powerful, affecting in particular the image 
of the Bundesrepublik and of its Chancellor: only a few weeks 
after being blamed for heartlessly proclaiming the necessity 
of admission restrictions before a weeping Palestinian refu-
gee girl,5 Merkel was hailed as a saviour by refugees march-
ing through Hungary towards the (temporarily) open borders 
with Austria and Germany.6  
3 http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/09/03/hollande-et-merkel-
se-mettent-d-accord-sur-des-quotas-contraignants-d-accueil-des-mi-
grants_4745055_3214.html
4 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-
agenda-migration/index_en.htm
5 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/16/angela-merkel-com-
forts-teenage-palestinian-asylum-seeker-germany
6 https://www.google.it/search?q=budapest+march+refugees&es_sm=93
&biw=1366&bih=667&noj=1&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0CA
gQ_AUoAmoVChMIkdjivZHixwIVR10aCh1X1AoN#imgrc=iEXFlpv2_8so7
M%3A
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What prompted such a spectacular turnabout? Personal and 
ethical factors may have played a role. And the message, 
implicit in the German move, that ethics, beyond legal obliga-
tions, can play a role in this policy field is in itself important.
But ethics aside, this U-turn has been driven primarily by 
political strategy. Germany has realized that, because of its 
economic strength and the functioning of migration networks, 
it is already bearing and will probably continue to bear the 
brunt of a migration and asylum crisis which, in the recent 
words of EU’s Foreign Policy High Representative, is ‘here to 
stay’.7 The only way to share this burden, at least in part, is to 
Europeanize the response in a new way: the solutions devised 
a quarter of a century ago in Schengen and Dublin (then too, 
with Germany playing a key role) have obviously become 
largely anachronistic and ineffective. But in order to build up 
the necessary consensus around a radically new migration 
and asylum regime, Germany will need to establish a more 
solid political and moral leadership at the pan-European level, 
after its political capital became eroded through controversial 
management of the Greek crisis. And suspending the Dublin 
rules can be seen as a first step in this direction.
Praise, accusations and backlashes
CThe announcement of this change of gears triggered politi-
cal countermeasures and a barrage of diplomatic reactions. 
Instead of praising the liberal and humanitarian aspects of 
the turn, some of the very countries that would immediately 
stand to benefit from the suspension of German requests for 
Dublin readmissions – Hungary in particular – now blamed 
Germany for creating incentives for a further expansion of 
the refugee tide.
Such reactions are reminiscent of those that followed the 
Italian launch of the large-scale search and rescue opera-
tion ‘Mare Nostrum’ in October 2013: also on that occasion, 
although it involved a unilateral and ethically grounded 
assump tion of political responsibility that was officially 
commended, the initiative was simultaneously and harshly 
accused by many of generating a ‘magnet effect’ for even 
greater refugee inflows.8 
The German opening has indeed been followed by a further 
expansion in the inflows into the Federal Republic through 
Hungary and Austria. The pressure of this intensified wave 
of arrivals has been particularly concentrated in the region 
of Munich, where the Christian Social Union (CSU) – a sister-
party to Merkel’s CDU governing Bavaria – had from the out-
set been critical against Berlin’s U-turn.
These political circumstances, combined with an ever grow-
ing strain on federal and local reception facilities, prompted 
German authorities on 13 September to temporarily reinstate 
border controls with Austria. Although the Commission, 
which had preventively been informed of the decision, 
quickly stated that it was compatible with Schengen rules,9 
the rest of Europe was taken by surprise. Should this be 
interpreted as an early repeal of the apparently strategic 
shift of just ten days before? Or is it just a temporary braking, 
necessary to adapt to a sudden and unforeseen rise in arriv-
als, as it was presented by the German government? Only 
time will provide a certain answer. What is sure in the short 
term, however, is that this major policy oscillation is not 
reinforcing the line of Germany and its allies in an already 
very difficult battle for reform. Furthermore, the unexpected 
German move could trigger a dangerous domino effect, with 
a number of other Schengen countries already announcing 
analogous measures in order to avoid becoming ‘dead alleys’ 
where people are trapped during their flight.
An East–West fracture?
TTo return to the mandatory relocation scheme now jointly 
advocated by the three largest founding members of the Euro-
pean Union, the negative reactions have quickly extended 
beyond isolated verbal onslaughts. As a matter of fact, it was 
soon clear that Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, with 
all his rhetorical excesses, was only the vocal spearhead of a 
broader potential blocking minority.
The visible vanguard of such negative front has recently been 
embodied by the four members of the Visegrad Group (the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, also known 
as the V4) which – in a Joint Statement issued in Prague on 4 
September 2015 – declared their engagement in ‘preserving 
the voluntary nature of EU solidarity measures – so that each 
Member State may build on its experience, best practices and 
available resources’, adding that ‘any proposal leading to 
introduction of mandatory and permanent quota for solidar-
ity measures would be unacceptable’.10
But the front of opponents is wider, with other EU member states 
less visibly sharing the V4’s concerns and thus contributing to 
perpetuate the political impasse in the Council, as it emerged 
again in the informal JHA meeting on 14 September. The fact 
that among these less vocal opponents of mandatory relocation 
are also the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) 
has prompted some observers to talk about an emerging “East–
West divide” among EU member states around an issue of key 
importance to the future of European integration.11 
The prospect of such a geopolitical split, less than a decade 
after the accomplishment of the great EU Eastern Enlarge-
ment, understandably raises immense concerns. It would be 
disastrous if such a central issue were reduced – as unfortu-
nately seems possible, judging from some early reactions – to 
a moral contrast between ‘selfish’ Easterners and ‘generous’ 
7 http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150905_01_en.htm
8 http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/oct/27/uk-mediterranean-
migrant-rescue-plan
9 http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/commis-
sion-oks-german-border-controls-urges-backing-migrant-plan?utm_
source=EurActiv+Newsletter&utm_campaign=a3c461f9a1-newsletter_
social_europe__jobs&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_bab5f0ea4e-
a3c461f9a1-245335561
10 http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2015/joint-statement-of-
the-150904
11 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e2523a84-53c2-11e5-8642-453585f2cfcd.
html
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Westerners, echoing the equally distorted and harmful carica-
tured contrast between Southern ‘grasshoppers’ and North-
ern ‘ants’ that has poisoned the debate on the euro-crisis.
On the one hand, it is important to remind the Central and 
Eastern European leaderships of the massive amounts of 
tangible solidarity that their countries are benefitting from. 
This concerns not only direct forms of redistribution, like 
structural funds, but also indirect, highly concrete forms 
of solidarity, like the very costly and controversial embargo 
against Russia, which has disproportionately affected the 
trade balances of Germany and several other (mainly Western 
and Southern) member states.12 
On the other hand, though, the intrinsic limits of mandatory 
relocation as a policy tool should be acknowledged and ana-
lysed with care, also recognising some of the reasons motivat-
ing the states which oppose it.
The limits of mandatory relocation
The first relevant argument, which is unfortunately rarely 
mentioned, is that any compulsory redistribution scheme may 
potentially conflict with the will of refugees themselves, and 
therefore – in my view – with the true spirit of asylum as a tool 
for protecting human dignity, and not just for ensuring survival.
Asylum-seekers’ preferences as to their destination are shaped 
by several factors, among which the perceived economic 
opportunities in the targeted destination understandably (and 
legitimately, I would add) play a key role. In the grotesquely 
simplified juxtaposition between ‘forced’ and ‘economic’ 
migrants, it is often forgotten (or blatantly ignored) that also 
refugees are economic actors, that they too need jobs in order 
to gain autonomy and protect their dignity. Therefore, manda-
tory relocation – should it extend beyond the short term and 
specific emergency situations – risks clashing not only with 
asylum principles, but also with basic economic tenets.
With some substantial differences among them, the Central 
and Eastern European states are globally still in the early (if 
not embryonic) phase of a possible (albeit not deterministi-
cally certain) transition to becoming countries of immigra-
tion.13 If the labour markets of the EU8 (the Central and 
Eastern European countries which joined the EU in 2004) and 
the EU2 (Bulgaria and Romania, members since 2007) have 
thus far been unable to attract and retain significant numbers 
of non-EU migrant workers, surely it is unlikely that they will 
from now on be able to ensure stable and satisfactory eco-
nomic integration for significant contingents of refugees.
Finally, in facing the threat of an East-West divide and in 
crafting the future of a more effective and fair European asy-
lum policy, one should not forget the political risks of any 
attempts at top–down enforcement of solidarity. Whether 
one likes it or not (and the present writer clearly does not 
like it), in several national political arenas today, institu-
tionalizing the role of the EU as coercive refugee-provider 
could play strongly into the hands of xenophobic and euro-
phobic forces. The possibility, under certain conditions, of 
‘swapping’ refugee quotas with economic sanctions, a point 
included in the most recent Commission proposals,14 could 
mitigate such a criticality by allowing an admittedly costly 
and case-by-case opt-out from EU-imposed relocations.
The next big European project
That a reform of EU’s asylum policies cannot be confined to 
more or less limited adjustments of the Dublin-based bur-
den-sharing criteria is by now evident to all key actors. This 
was acknowledged in particularly explicit, demanding and 
forward-looking terms by Angela Merkel in her traditional 
mid-summer interview to the TV chain ZDF on 16 August 
2015, when she stated that a joint European asylum policy 
would be ‘the next major European project, in which we 
show whether we are really able to take joint action’, adding 
for greater impact and clarity: ‘these issues will preoccupy us 
much, much more in the future than the issue of Greece and 
the stability of the euro’.15 
But if awareness of the need for a radical overhaul is growing, 
the actual contours and contents of this ‘next big European 
project’ are still conceptually vague and politically evasive. 
The Commission’s European Agenda on Migration provides 
a valuable coordinated menu of possible measures – but it 
does not (nor could it) devise a political and communication 
strategy with a clear definition of priorities, acceptable trade-
offs and compromises, key messages, etc. that could turn 
that menu into concrete reality.
As in previous critical phases of the process of European inte-
gration, an important guiding principle should concern the 
proportionality between powers and responsibilities, as well 
as between costs and benefits, goals and means, at national 
and EU level. Such proportionality should be rigorously and 
consistently respected and ensured in all areas of asylum and 
migration policies – indeed, the two cannot be kept separate 
any more, given the now firmly established reality of ‘mixed 
flows’ at the EU’s external borders.
What would these apparently banal principles imply in the 
medium and long term? At the first level, they would require 
gradually righting the fundamental imbalances embed-
ded in the 25-year-old Schengen+Dublin regime. At a more 
advanced level, however, such a proportionality principle 
would and probably will push towards more radical changes, 
including substantial pooling of sovereignty – in the treat-
ment of mixed flows at external borders (including direct 
competence for search-and-rescue activities), asylum proce-
dures and the reception of asylum-seekers.
12 http://www.rt.com/business/178888-russia-trade-ban-who-hurts/
13 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_
and_migrant_population_statistics
14 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-
agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/proposal_for_
regulation_of_ep_and_council_establishing_a_crisis_relocation_mecha-
nism_en.pdf
15 http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2015/08_en/2015-
08-16-merkel-interview-zdf_en.html
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Pooling migratory sovereignty
Embryonic forms of shared sovereignty on asylum and migra-
tion are emerging every day: be it with the quiet but highly 
significant evolution of Triton towards something similar to a 
multinational Mare Nostrum, or with the still somewhat con-
fused process of establishing ‘hotspots’ – multinational and 
multifunctional units intended to balance solidarity with 
direct controls on rule compliance by border states.
A European Coast Guard and a European Asylum Authority 
increasingly appear to be the long-term possible and perhaps 
necessary result of such experiments. But such developments 
will be able to generate real changes only if they can be coor-
dinated and incorporated into a clear and comprehensive 
system of governance. This would be a system where the loss 
of sovereignty suffered by EU-border member states in bor-
der management and admission policies would be tangibly 
and timely compensated by serious guarantees of solidarity 
embodied, for instance, in the creation of an EU-wide refugee 
status which should entail substantial freedom of movement 
for its holders not too long after recognition.
Furthermore, none of the above will be sufficient unless 
accompanied by a major upgrade of the EU’s foreign policy 
and external action capacities. Only with a dramatic rein-
forcement of common soft power, but also of joint peace-
keeping and peace-enforcement capacities, will the EU be 
able to manage future migration and refugee crises without 
doing violence to its fundamental humanitarian principles – 
as it did in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and now more 
recently in Libya and in Syria.
Along this enormously challenging path, the role of some old 
compagnons de route of the EU in the field of migration and 
asylum might prove very important. Not least, this should 
apply regarding Norway, as one of Schengen’s non-EU sig-
natories. The role of Norway will be relevant, and not only 
because of major and multidimensional interdependencies, 
enhanced by the fundamental asset for Europe as a whole 
represented by Nordic Council’s free movement area. In addi-
tion come the specific contributions Norway could bring to 
the development of a radically upgraded European migration 
and asylum policy. Such positive contributions could involve 
areas as diverse as search and rescue (building on the valua-
ble experience made with the participation of the vessel Siem 
Pilot in the Triton Operation), border controls (increasingly 
important with the worrying emergence of an ‘Arctic route’ 
from Russia) and even the external dimension of migration 
and asylum policy. Here Norway, with its specific expertise 
on key sender-countries like Eritrea, could play an important 
role in understanding and tackling the root causes of forced 
migration in and around the Horn of Africa.
All this will necessarily make for a very long-term and very 
big European project. If successful, such project will allow 
the EU to survive without perverting itself and its ideals, 
but it will inevitably entail major political costs. In particu-
lar, moving towards more substantial sovereignty pooling 
on asylum and migration is unlikely to be acceptable to all 
member states – or at least not for all at the same rate. A 
double-pace approach, with a core set of countries trigger-
ing reinforced cooperation and encouraging others to join 
at a later stage, allowed Schengen to become what was until 
recently praised as a European ‘success story’. A quarter of a 
century later, a compact and resolute avant-garde might once 
again be needed to push integration forward, but hopefully 
this time on less imbalanced foundations.
